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A B S T R A C T
The optical communication has an increasing need for security in public transmission
scenarios. Here we present a protocol for cryptographic key distribution over a public
network via photon-counting compressive imaging system with watermarking, which
utilizes watermarking technique to distribute secure keys, and uses reconstructed im-
ages for simultaneous identity authentication and tampering identification. The wa-
termark is embedded in the rearranged compressed measurements of the object, and
then the signal is transmitted through a public network. At the receiving terminal,
the legitimate users can easily extract the watermark as the cryptographic key by
using initial keys and the variance characteristic of random measurements. Artificial
tampering and attacks can be detected by the accurately retrieved images. The real-
ization of this protocol is a step forward toward the practical applications, and will be
beneficial for the broader fields of optical security in many ways.
Keywords: Optical communications; Secure key distribution; Image reconstruction;
Compressive sensing; Single-pixel imaging
1 Introduction
In recent years, digital information has been widely transmitted through inse-
cure public network [1] where the data is particularly easy to be wiretapped
by others, thus the techniques for information security are of great importance.
Many optical encryption methods have been developed. As far as we know,
the double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique [2] proposed in 1995 may
be the first successful example in optical encryption. Based on optical parallel
characteristics, it generally uses double spatial light modulators for phase encod-
ing and array charge-coupled devices (CCDs) for recording the intensities [3–6].
Lately, the DRPE has been integrated with photon-counting to obtain better
security and verification performance [7–9], but its sampling is still redundant.
Fortunately, the newly developed theory of compressed sensing (CS) [10–12]
provides a new technical solution for DRPE compression during the optical sam-
pling [13], and allows one to accurately reconstruct the signal known a priori
to be sparse or compressive from its linear projections, with a sampling rate far
below the Nyquist rate [10,11]. Given all these advantages of CS, many methods
in optical security field, like Ptychography [14], quick response codes [15], have
been recently combined with compressed DRPE to enhance their performance.
On the other hand, CS has developed a single-pixel camera [16, 17] to acquire
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wider applications, like in remote sensing [18, 19], adaptive ghost imaging [20],
biological imaging [21], phase retrieval [22], and so forth. Recent works have
successfully combined single-pixel compressive imaging with optical encryption,
where the signal and its compressed measurements are treated as the plain-
text and the ciphertext. This technology is proven to be able to increase the
security [23, 24] and thus becomes popular.
With the developments of information age, one important issue is how to
improve the security of the information delivered by the public network, es-
pecially in financial transactions, secure video communication, Internet confer-
ences, telemedicine, and the like. Our earlier works have proposed a protocol for
high-speed secure key distribution over a public network [25, 26], in which the
legitimate parties acquire the cryptographic keys from the images recovered by
computational ghost imaging algorithms. Note that the watermarking [27–29]
and data hiding [30,31] are two representative choices for privacy protection [32]
by embedding a label to a visible image, we find that they may be useful for
improving the performance of the secure key distribution. However, to our
knowledge, most of traditional watermarking techniques needed to embed the
watermark into the non-overlapping blocks of original image [29–31], and failed
to consider authentication and tampering identification aspects. Besides, the
watermarked image transmission may incur the content leakage.
In this work, we propose a watermarking-based protocol for cryptographic
key distribution over a public network, in which the watermark is regarded as the
cryptographic key to be distributed. In the carrier generation process, based on
a single-pixel compressive imaging system, the server uses a digital micromirror
device (DMD) for random modulation and a photomultiplier tube (PMT) for
photon counting. Then the server will embed the watermark in the rearranged
compressed measurements which have no spatial correlation, rather than in the
image or its non-overlapping divided blocks, thus increasing the confidentiality
and imperceptibility of the cryptographic key, and without the content leakage.
After that, the disordered sequence will be sent to the legitimate users through
the public network. With the aid of the initial keys and the variance charac-
teristic of measurements, the valid parties can exactly extracted the distributed
cryptographic key. By utilizing CS algorithm, the users can reconstruct the
images for simultaneous efficient authentication and tampering identification.
Additionally, unlike traditional optical communication schemes that are mainly
based on the two-dimensional encrypted images, our protocol also offers an alter-
native approach for embedding the watermark directly in the randomly-ordered
one-dimensional sampled signal as well as taking full advantage of the variance
characteristic of measurements, which will have a great impact on research in
the broader fields of optical security, especially in cryptographic key distribution
applications.
2 Protocol
Our protocol applies CS for carrier generation and authentication. In CS, an
image signal x of pixel size s× t can be reshaped into a one-dimensional column
vector of length N = s× t. Every pattern encoded on the DMD has the same
size as the object image, and is flattened accordingly into a row vector aj of
length N . There are M random binary patterns that will be sequentially fed
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into the DMD, the row vectors reshaped from these M patterns are rearranged
into a measurement matrix A ∈ RM×N . Rather than directly sampling the im-
age pixel values, CS captures the linear projections of the signal at a rate that
is significantly below the Nyquist rate, namely, it samples the inner product
between M modulating row vector aj and the signal x. Thus the problem can
be given by a set of linear equations: y = Ax+ e, where y is the observed mea-
surement vector, e ∈ RM×1 denotes the stochastic noise. Hence simultaneous
compression and sampling of an image can be achieved. Generally, the natu-
ral signal x can be sparsely represented in a certain basis (e.g., discrete cosine
transform basis, Fourier transform basis, wavelet basis) Ψ = [ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψN ],
thus x = Ψx′, or x =
N∑
i=1
x′iψi, where x
′ ∈ RN×1 is the coefficient sequence
of x. Since the total variation (TV) regularization can ensure excellent recon-
structed image quality by preserving the edges accurately [17], here we use TV
solver as the sparse basis. In order to satisfy the restricted isometry property
(RIP) [12], the column vectors taken from arbitrary subsets of the measurement
matrix A should be approximately orthogonal and incoherent with the sparse
basis. It is found that a completely random matrix A works well in general
and is largely incoherent with any fixed basis. Therefore, the random measure-
ment matrix is adopted here, and its randomness can render the measurement
data unintelligible. The object image can be reconstructed precisely from the
dimension reduction measurements via optimization algorithm.
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the protocol based on watermarking for cryp-
tographic key distribution over a public network.
This protocol is an extension of our previous work [25, 26]. Here, the mea-
surement matrix is used as a key known by the legitimate parties in advance,
and a watermark label is embedded to the measured signal for cryptographic
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key distribution. As depicted in figure 1, our protocol can be divided into four
parts: carrier generation, watermark embedding, watermark extraction, and au-
thentication. Figure 2 shows the detailed procedure for watermark embedding
and extraction.
Figure 2: Procedure for the watermark embedding (left panel) and extraction
(right panel).
2.1 Carrier generation
In the carrier generation step, the server performs compressive sampling [11]
via a single-pixel imaging system, which is simpler than DRPE setup. The
object and the measurement matrix can be denoted as x and A, then the carrier
y ∈ RM×1 can be acquired by the linear equations y = Ax + e. For different
legitimate parties, the object x and the measurement matrix A can be different.
Therefore, our protocol can realize multiparty communication.
2.2 Watermark embedding
Here the watermark is treated as the cryptographic key to be distributed. In
the watermark embedding process as shown in the left half of figure 2, y will be
disordered by the server via the random allocation key 1 to obtain y′, which is
then divided into M/r (the same as the length of the watermark) groups with
each of size r. For the ith group, if the element value wi in the watermark
equals to 1, then all the bits in the corresponding group (denoted as seqi, i =
1, 2, · · · ,M/r) of y′ are exclusive-ORed (XOR), otherwise, leaving it as it is,
i.e.,
seqi =
{
XOR(seqi), if wi = 1;
seqi, otherwise.
(1)
Here using XOR for watermark embedding is a common operation [30]. By this
means, we will get the sequence y′′, which will be disordered again according
to the random allocation key 2 to obtain y′′′. After that, the signal y′′′ will be
transmitted through the public network to the legitimate users.
2.3 Watermark extraction
In the watermark extraction as shown in the right half of figure 2, the legitimate
receiver restores b′ via the random allocation key 2, and then carries out XOR
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operation on every bit of b′ to obtain b′′ (this operation we call global XOR).
The values w′i of the watermark bits are extracted via
w′i =
{
1, if var(b′′i ) < var(b
′
i);
0, otherwise,
(2)
where var denotes the variance. According to the extracted watermark and the
group assignment, the XOR operation of the whole bits in the divided groups
of b′ that correspond to the extracted watermark bit value 1 is performed, also
via Eq. 1, to get b′′′. In theory, b′ and b′′′ equals to y′′ and y′, respectively.
The correct sequence b is then recovered following the random allocation key
1. Theoretically, b equals to y with a great probability. Through the above
operations, legitimate users will finally get the corresponding cryptographic keys
distributed from the server. The cryptographic keys can be used to encrypt the
plaintext and decrypt the ciphertext during the multiparty communication.
2.4 Authentication
Finally, the receiving parties use the TVAL3 algorithm [17] to recover the image
from A and b for identity authentication, as demonstrated in figure 1. The core
TV norm minimization of TVAL3 can be described as:
min
x
∑
i
‖Dix‖p +
µ
2
‖b−Ax‖2
2
, s.t. Ax+ e = b, Dix = x
′
i and x ≥ 0 for all i,
(3)
where
(
‖u‖p
)p
=
∑N
i=1 |ui|
p
stands for lp norm. Dix is the discrete gradient
vector of x at position i, D is the gradient operator, and µ > 0 is a penalty
constant scalar used to balance these two terms.
∑
i ‖Dix‖p is the TV regular-
ization term, which is isotropic for p = 2, and anisotropic for p = 1. Here we
use the isotropic (the higher, 2nd-order) derivative to get better image quality
for authentication.
3 Simulation
To obtain a quantitative measure of the image quality, the peak signal-to-noise
ratio (PSNR) is defined here as a figure of merit:
PSNR = 10 log(2552/MSE), (4)
where MSE = 1
st
∑s,t
i,j=1[Uo(i, j) − U˜(i, j)]
2. The MSE describes the squared
distance between the recovered image U˜ and the original image Uo for all s× t
pixels. Naturally, the larger the PSNR value, the better the quality of the image
recovered.
Additionally, we introduce another unitless performance measure, the bit
error rate (BER), which is defined as
BER =
1
len
len∑
i=1
|Wi −Qi|. (5)
Here,W is the original watermark, Q is the extracted watermark, and len is the
length ofW . Therefore, the BER is the number of bit errors divided by the total
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length of the watermark bits during a time interval studied. The generation of
error bits is mostly due to noise, randomness, or tampering.
Figure 3: Simulation results. (a) is the original phantom image of 64×64 pixels;
(b) and (c) are the recovered results via TVAL3, with a BER of 0.00% and
0.00%, and a PSNR of 64.72 dB and 62.48 dB, respectively. The length of each
watermark for (b) and (c) is 8 bits (1 bytes) and 64 bits (8 bytes), respectively.
In order to extract the watermark more accurately, the same watermark repeats
five times. The number of measurements M (i.e., the length of the measured
signal) for (b) and (c) is 1280 and 5120, thus the signal is distributed into 40
and 320 groups (i.e., r = 32 and 16 bits per groups), respectively. (d) shows
the variance of the first eight groups of b′ and b′′ of (b). The watermark bit
values are extracted to be 1 for var(b′′) < var(b′), 0 otherwise. Since the original
watermark used here is “1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1”, the extracted watermark is correct.
To illustrate our strategy, the simulation procedure is presented in figure 3.
After the sampling, the watermark embedding and extraction will be performed.
According to the CS theory, the original image can be any complex gray-scale
or colour-scale image, as long as it is sparse or compressive. Generally speaking,
many natural images except pure noisy ones have sparse representations when
they are expressed in a certain basis. It is worth noting that the watermark can
be not only a binary vector but also a gray-scale image, because the image pixel
values can be easily converted into a binary sequence and linked end-to-end
to form a long one in watermark embedding, and vice versa during watermark
extraction. After that, the CS image [figure 3(b) and (c)] can be recovered
accurately if and only if the extracted watermark is exactly consistent with the
original one. Although the poor quality of the recovered image is possibly caused
by the measurement noise, we find that repeatedly using the same watermark
can greatly improve the image quality. Here the watermark is reused five times
in one set of measurements to reduce the negative effect of the measurement
noise on the quality of the extracted watermark. The number five used here is
an empirical parameter. Actually, for a 40-bit watermark with five repetitions,
when the group (block) size r is set to 11, the BER is already low enough; when
r is larger than 20, the watermark is extracted exactly with high immunity to
noise, as illustrated in figure 4. Therefore, by applying this strategy, the quality
of the CS image can be used for authentication to validate whether there exists
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Figure 4: BER of the non-repeating watermark and the one with five repeats
versus the group size r. The original image is the same with figure 3(a), and
the watermark has 40 bits (5 bytes).
an attacker or not. The demonstrating experiment is performed by increasing
the measurement number. There is a tradeoff between the group size for the
BER performance and the length of the watermark.
4 Experimental validation and results
The carrier generation process of our proposal is based on a photon-counting
single-pixel camera, as presented in figure 5. The binary modulation patterns
are provided by a DMD. In the experiment, the thermal light from a stabilized
halogen tungsten light source with a wavelength range from 360 nm to 2600 nm
passes through a beam expander and a neutral density filter (NDF) onto a
black-and-white film (the object) with a printed transparent letter “S”. Here the
NDF is used to attenuate the light to the ultra-weak light level. The object is
then imaged directly onto the DMD which consists of 1024× 768 micromirrors.
Each micromirror is switched between two positions oriented at ±12◦, which
correspond to a bright pixel 1 and a dark pixel 0, determined by the pattern. The
reflected light in one of the orientations is converged onto one spot by a focusing
lens and is collected by a counter-type Hamamatsu H10682-210 PMT. Since
the PMT counts the number of the photons that is proportional to the total
light intensity for each pattern, it can be treated as a single-photon detector.
Actually, the recorded photon sequence y is a measured signal of the object.
Following the procedures given in figure 2, it is simple for the receiver to obtain
the signal y′′′ from the public network, to extract the watermark, and to recover
the signal b according to the random allocation keys 1 and 2. It is worth noting
that all the values of y′ should be converted into a binary sequence for XOR
operation, and b′′ should be turned back to a decimal sequence at last. Using
the measurement matrix, the image is recovered by total variation minimization
for identity authentication. Here the experimental setup is simple and the whole
techniques reduce the complexity.
Each pattern corresponds to one row of the measurement matrix A, and
has 64 × 64 pixels, of the same size as the CS image. There are M binary
patterns, thus the size of A is M × N with N = 64 × 64. The experimental
results [figure 6] are in accord with figure 3. In the case of five-repetition usage
of the same watermark, we get five sets of extracted results, compute their
average, and then set the value to 0 if the mean is less than 0.5, and 1 otherwise.
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Figure 5: Schematic of the experimental setup. After being collimated and
broadened, the light illuminates the object and the DMD, and the total photon
counts are recorded by a PMT.
Figure 6: Experimental results. (a) and (b) are obtained from the measured
signal y and the calculated signal b, respectively, but with the same matrix A.
The number of measurementsM (i.e., the length of the signal) for (a) and (b) is
both 2560. Here the watermark is also reused five times, with each watermark’s
size of 16 bits (2 bytes), thus the signal can be distributed into 80 groups (i.e.,
r = 32 bits). The BER of the watermark is 0.00%, and the PSNR of (b) refers
to (a) is 44.09 dB. (c) is the intermediate process for the watermark extraction.
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From figure 6(c), it can be seen that the calculated watermark is accurate with
large probability. Here A is generated by a random physical process. Since
the photon fluctuations contain the stochastic intensity fluctuations of the light
source, scattering noise along the light path, and shot noise, the signal y has true
randomness as well as good information imperceptibility. Here the matrix A,
the random allocation keys 1 and 2, and some other essential parameters (like
the imaging area, the pixel size, the number of measurements, the allocation
selection strategy) are all used as the initial keys, which are distributed to
the legitimate parties through absolutely secure approaches (e.g., secure hash
algorithm 3, quantum key distribution protocol) in advance. In the future,
we can also make a difference between each adjacent frames to perform the
“positive-negative” modulation and acquire a very satisfactory image quality
[19]. For full-colour imaging, one can use three spectral filters to restore the
red, green, and blue sub-images, extending the dimension of the signal carrier.
5 Security analysis and discussion
Figure 7: Reconstructions after some attacks. The original recovered image
that corresponds to the unassailed signal y′′′ can be found in figure 6(b). Since
y′′′ is transmitted through the public network, the attacker/eavesdropper Eve
can arbitrarily tamper with the data. (a) is a CS image that is recovered with
y′′′ completely disordered by Eve, and with a PSNR of 13.68 dB and a BER of
56.25%. Then, take any value of the signal y′′′ for example, make the 13th, 14th,
15th, 16th bit (counting from low to high) incorrect, we will obtain the results
(b)–(e), with a PSNR of 12.81 dB, 11.70 dB, 11.45 dB, 10.89 dB, respectively.
Since the value is stored in doubles type, i.e., each element takes up 64 bits
(8 bytes), our method can detect this kind of tampering with a probability of
52/64 = 81.25%, for the case that only one bit has been falsified. (f)–(i) are
the retrieved images with 8, 16, 32, 64 values of y′′′ substituted with 0, and
with a PSNR of 18.08 dB, 16.88 dB, 14.27 dB, 13.32 dB, respectively. (j) is
the reconstructed image with one value missing and all the subsequent data is
shifted. Its PSNR is 12.82 dB and BER is 37.50%. Here the length of y′′′ is all
2560, and the watermark is also reused five times.
Now let us discuss the security of our one-time-pad protocol against different
attacks. Here, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we directly perform
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our security analysis on the experimentally recorded signal. Assume that the
eavesdropper Eve possesses any advanced technique. In order to ensure infor-
mation transmission security, further channel coding and decoding can be used.
Even if Eve knows complete y′′′ from the public network, to recover the wa-
termark she must guess the random allocation key 2 exactly, which costs a full
permutation of M . In the case of figure 7, we have M = 2560, thus Eve must
sweep throughM !≫ 2M ≫M2 (whenM >= 5) possible permutations. For ex-
ample, from 170! = 7.2574× 10306, we see that 2560! is thought to be extremely
large. Assuming that each run costs a few milliseconds for a supercomputer, it
will take many years to finish the exhaustion. Furthermore, if Eve wants to get
the CS image, she must firstly spend anotherM ! possible permutations to guess
the random allocation key 1 and recover the signal b, and secondly guess all the
frames and secure parameters. For a 2560× 4096 binary measurement matrix,
where 4096 = 64×64, the probability of it being deciphered through exhaustive
attack is 210485760. Actually, the size of the image and the measurement matrix
can be much larger, and the measurement matrix owned by each user can also
be different. So it is impossible for her to decipher the communication.
Additionally, Eve can also intercept the signal y′′′, falsify some bits in it
and then send it to the legitimate users, as illustrated in figure 7. However,
the legitimate party can easily discover Eve’s presence by checking the quality
of recovered images, whether she completely disorders the signal y′′′, or only
changes one fixed bit in each value, or takes some values away. If one user
finds that the quality of CS image is poor, then he/she can conclude that there
must exist an attack. Therefore, it is demonstrated that our method has a
highly sensitivity to the intentional tampering and an outstanding performance
for data tamper detection. It is worth mentioning that our protocol is robust
against the attack because of its particular scheme, rather than the experiment.
Thus we can regard this protocol as being greatly safe for practical applications
in defense, communication, and financial market.
6 Conclusions
In conclusion, we propose a secure protocol for cryptographic key distribution
over a public network, where a watermark is treated as the cryptographic key to
be distributed from the server to the valid parties. The compressive sampling
is experimentally performed via a single-pixel photon-counting imaging system,
in which the photon-limited measurements contribute additional security of the
protocol. The watermark is embedded directly in the randomly-rearranged com-
pressive measurements, rather than in the image or its non-overlapping divided
blocks, ensuring the confidentiality and imperceptibility of the cryptographic
key and avoiding the content leakage. Thus the watermark embedding is ac-
tually performed between compressive sampling and authentication procedures.
At the receiving terminal, based on the initial keys and the variance of dis-
ordered measurement sequence that is send through the public network, the
legitimate users have full access to both the accurate watermark and the en-
crypted image, the latter can be used for efficient authentication and tampering
identification. Both numerical simulation and experimental results show that
our approach owns a good robustness against different eavesdropping attacks.
This protocol may pave the way for applying the variance characteristic of the
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measurements in optical secure communication, and will have a great impact
on many practical applications of optical security.
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